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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GILBERT LORETTO,

:

De f endant/Appe11ant.

Case No. 960622-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Gilbert Loretto appeals his conviction for
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-302 (1995) and 76-2-202 (1995).

This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did defendant preserve his claim that the trial court

should have quashed the jury panel based on one prospective
juror's discussion of her personal biases?

Alternatively, has

defendant established that denying the motion deprived him of his
right to trial by an impartial jury where the record contains no
evidence that the prospective juror's comments influenced the
remaining panel members?
1

No Utah cases establish a standard of review for motions to
quash the panel based on a prospective juror's comments. This
Court should review the decision for an abuse of discretion.

Cf,

State v. Morgan. 865 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Utah App. 1993) (trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for
mistrial based on one juror's misconduct).

In any event,

defendant invited any error and failed to argue to the trial
court the claims he argues on appeal; therefore, the court need
not consider this case on the merits.

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d

1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (defendant cannot complain on appeal about
an error into which he led the trial court); State v. Range1. 866
P.2d 607, 612 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that reference to due
process concerns were insufficiently specific to preserve
Rangel's appellate claim of facial unconstitutionality).
2.

Does the record contain sufficient evidence to support

the jury's conclusion that defendant acted as an accomplice to
the aggravated robbery?
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court
views the evidence and the inferences from it in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict.
1212 (Utah 1993).

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,

This Court may reverse for insufficient

evidence "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently

2

inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted."
3.

Id.

Did the instructions unfairly emphasize the elements of

aggravated robbery over those of accomplice liability where the
trial court gave more instructions on accomplice liability?
This Court should adopt a deferential standard of review for
reviewing the trial court's selection of legally sufficient
instructions.

QJL. State v. Gallegos.

849 P.2d 586, 590 (Utah

App. 1993) (the trial court has discretion to select between two
legally sufficient, but different jury instructions).

In

reviewing the instructions, this Court reviews the instructions
as a whole to determine if they fairly instruct the jury on the
applicable law.

State v. Robertson. No. 940374 at 19 (Utah

February 18, 1997).
4.

Has defendant preserved his challenge to the trial

court's reasonable doubt instruction?

Alternatively, did the

trial court correctly instruct the jury on reasonable doubt by
giving an instruction that both this Court and the Utah Supreme
Court have approved?
The trial court has discretion to select between two
accurate but different jury instructions.
3

State v. Gallegos. 849

P.2d 586, 590 (Utah App. 1993).

In reviewing the instructions,

this Court reviews the instructions as a whole to determine if
they fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law.

State v.

Robertson. No, 940374 at 19 (Utah February 18, 1997).
In this case, defendant both invited any error in giving the
trial court's reasonable doubt instruction and did not object to
the instruction with sufficient particularity to preserve his
appellate argument; therefore, the Court need not consider the
claim on its merits.

See State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700

(Utah App. 1995) (invited error where defendant told the court
that its instruction was legally sufficient), cert, denied. 913
P.2d 794 (Utah 1996); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360-61 (Utah
App. 1993) (requiring specificity in trial court objections to
preserve appellant's argument).
5,

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion

for a continuance to locate a potential witness where defendant
had no idea whether the witness had information relevant to the
case or could attend the trial?
This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for a
continuance for a clear abuse of discretion.
CafrutUtan, 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993).

4

See, e.g., State v.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-202
(1995) and 76-6-302 (1995).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By amended information, the State charged defendant with
being a party to an aggravated robbery (R. 96) . The jury
convicted defendant as charged (R. 169, 3 90).

The trial court

sentenced defendant to the statutory five-years-to-life prison
term, and imposed a $1,000 fine with an eighty-five percent
surcharge (R. 173).
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 174).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant assisted an unidentified man who robbed the victim
at knife point.
Carrie Flores went to a Smith's Food King one January
evening (R. 304) . While waiting to pay for her groceries, she
noticed three men, including defendant, in the checkout line
behind her (id.).

Ms. Flores paid with a fifty-dollar bill and

held the change in her hand as she left the store (R. 305).
After putting the groceries in the passenger side of her
car, Ms. Flores walked to the driver's door (R. 306). As she
opened the door, she looked up to discover defendant and the
5

other two men from the store standing directly in front of her
(id.).

One of them stood about one foot from her, held a knife

to her chest, and demanded the change from the fifty dollars(R.
306-309, 315). Defendant stood to the right and slightly behind
the man with the knife; the third man stood in the same position
on the other side (R. 307-308, 315). Ms. Flores gave the cash to
the man with the knife and left the parking lot (R. 310-11, 31819).

Police arrested defendant at the store approximately two

days later (R. 343).
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

l.

Denial of motion to quash jury panel-

Defendant

contends that comments made by one prospective juror tainted the
entire panel; therefore, the trial court deprived him of his
right to trial by an impartial jury when it denied his motion to
quash the panel.

Defendant invited any error and failed to

preserve his appellate arguments.

Defendant suggested first

asking the panel generally whether the comments affected them and
did not argue that the trial court had to quash the panel
regardless of the response.

The trial court adopted defendant's

suggestion, and no jurors stated that the comments influenced
them.

Defendant did not renew his motion.
6

Defendant also contends that the single question was
insufficient to remove the taint.

However, the trial court

limited its subsequent inquiry at defendant's request.
Similarly, defendant did not sufficiently preserve his
appellate arguments.

In the trial court, he contended only that

the comments may have generated a general negative response to
him.

On appeal, he contends that the comments suggested he

belonged to a gang.

His trial objection lacked sufficient

specificity to preserve his appellate claim.
Alternatively, this claim fails on its merits.

The record

establishes that the comments did not affect the other panel
members.
2.

Sufficiency of the evidence.

Defendant contends that

the evidence shows, at most, that he was merely present during
the robbery because he did not say anything intelligible, hold
the knife to the victim, demand the money from her, or receive
it.

However, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant

participated as an accomplice.

Defendant did not stand back or

move away from the other two men, and he stood close enough to
see the robbery.

The three men confronted Ms. Flores in

formation: the lead man holding the knife to her chest, his
accomplices, including defendant, close behind on either side.
7

All three stood close enough to Ms. Flores to grab her if she had
tried to escape.

The number of men and their proximity to Ms.

Flores made it less likely that Ms. Flores would try to escape or
that she could escape; their number made the confrontation in a
dark parking lot more intimidating; and the positions taken by
the group suggests a planned confrontation, or at least a
concerted effort by all three men.

3.

Jury instruction; accomplice liability.

Defendant

contends that the trial court unfairly emphasized the elements of
aggravated robbery over those of accomplice liability by
including an instruction defining aggravated robbery in addition
to the elements instruction which included the elements of both
aggravated robbery and accomplice liability.

The record rebuts

the underlying premise of defendant's argument: that the trial
court gave more instructions on aggravated robbery than on
accomplice liability.

Including the elements instruction, the

trial court gave two instructions on aggravated robbery, but gave
four on accomplice liability.
In any event, defendant cannot establish prejudice on this
record.

Both counsel's closing arguments clearly identified

accomplice liability as the critical determination.

8

4.

Jury instructions: reasonable doubt instruction.

Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously defined
reasonable doubt for the jury.

Defendant invited any error in

the instructions when he told the trial court that its proposed
instruction sufficiently defined reasonable doubt under Utah law.
Similarly, defendant failed to object with sufficient specificity
to preserve his appellate claim.

He identified for the trial

court none of the specific deficiencies he argues on appeal,
stating to the trial court only that he believed his instruction
defined reasonable doubt more clearly.
Alternatively, the claim fails on its merits.

First, the

trial court defined reasonable doubt in language approved by both
this Court and the Utah Supreme court.

Second, the claim depends

on dissecting the instruction and scrutinizing its individual
sentences and phrases.

This Court has expressly rejected this

analysis and it contradicts the normal requirement of reviewing
the instructions as a whole.

Defendant's arguments fail under

the appropriate analysis.
5.

Motion for continuance.

The trial court properly

denied defendant's motion for a continuance to contact a
potential witness.

Defendant had no idea if the witness had any

information relevant to the case or could attend the trial and
9

testify on his behalf.

Therefore, he failed in his burden to

establish the potential witness's materiality and availability.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD HAVE QUASHED THE PANEL; ALTERNATIVELY, HIS
ARGUMENT FAILS ON ITS MERITS BECAUSE THE RECORD
CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PANEL WAS BIASED
Defendant contends that the trial court's denial of his
motion to quash the jury panel based on the remarks of a
prospective juror deprived him of his right to trial by an
impartial jury.

Appellant's Brief at 12. According to

defendant, the remarks suggested to the jurors that defendant
belonged to a Mexican gang.

Appellant's Brief at 9-10.

During voir dire, prospective juror Bingham stated that she
could not sit through the trial.

She told the court that one of

the witnesses had the same build as her son who had just
committed suicide (R. 212). When the court asked her if she
could concentrate on the trial, Ms. Bingham responded:
I'm a very emotional person. We live next door to
a Mexican. Still upset at them in gangs and he -- he
dressed just like he did. I can't understand. Why
can't he shave that thing off the back of his head?
I'm sorry. I don't know if I could be fair
(id.).

The trial court excused Ms. Bingham immediately after her

10

statement (R. 213).
In a subsequent in-chambers conference, defense counsel
moved to quash the entire panel, alleging that Ms. Bingham's
references to defendant's hair style may have tainted all the
prospective jurors (R. 272-73).

According to counsel:

We, I'm afraid that the other jurors would say,
gee, I hadn't noticed that hairstyle. Now she's
speaking of it and I noticed that, too. And geez, that
is kind of a problem. That's an unusual hairstyle and
wonder what that means, or maybe they know someone of a
similar style. They've got a problem with that. And
simply point that out to them. And certainly, she made
it quite clear that for her, that's a negative thing.
And it seems like others are then going to be
particularly noticing that and maybe they will say,
gee, maybe I think that's negative, too. I mean,
that's the whole reason why we don't want people
expressing negative opinions about defendants or
witnesses or whatever, because the rest, well, it might
get them thinking as well
(R. 274). Counsel never specifically complained that Ms.
Bingham's comments might have suggested to the other prospective
jurors that defendant belonged to a gang.
The State conceded that Ms. Bingham made inappropriate
comments, but pointed out that nothing showed that the comments
had affected any of the jurors (R. 273). In response, defense
counsel suggested asking the jurors generally whether the
comments affected them, then asking for the details in chambers

11

if any jurors responded affirmatively to the general question (R.
273-74).

The State agreed to this procedure (R. 275). The court

decided to ask the question, then denied defendant's motion uat
this point" (R. 275) .
When court resumed, the trial court asked:
Do you recall Mrs. Helen Bingham, Juror No. 3, who
had had a recent suicide in her family, who was quite
emotional as she responded to some of my questions.
And Mrs. Bingham made some comments about some
personal prejudices in connection with this case. And
perhaps that could be interpreted by some that way, not
entirely clear, but she mentioned various things that
concerned her about this case and in connection with
the defendant in this case.
Anyone here who feels that they were influenced by
those comments of Mrs. Bingham in any way that would
make it difficult for them to be fair and impartial,
based upon her comments? Anyone? No response.
(R. 281). Defendant did not renew his motion to quash the panel.
Defendant now complains that Ms. Bingham's comments
introduced evidence outside the record: a suggestion that
defendant belonged to a gang.

Appellant's Brief at 9-10.

Defendant also contends that the subsequent voir dire, the scope
of which he defined, did not sufficiently rebut an inference that
the comments tainted the panel. Appellant's Brief at 10-ll.1

defendant also states that the panel may have reacted to
Ms. Bingham's remarks and felt some personal bias toward him.
12

A,

Defendant waived his appellate claims.

Defendant failed to preserve his appellate claims because:
1) he invited any error by suggesting that the trial court first
ask the jurors if the comments affected them; 2) he invited any
error in the scope of the curative voir dire because he defined
the scope; 3) after the remaining panel members denied that Ms.
Bingham's comments had influenced them, defendant did not renew
his motion to quash the panel; and 4) he did not make the
specific objection to the trial court that he argues in support
of reversing his conviction.
This Court will not review an error that defendant led the
trial court into committing.

See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d

1201, 1220-21 (Utah 1993); State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 12051206 (Utah App. 1991).

In Perdue. the trial court selected two

instructions that Perdue's counsel submitted.

Id. at 1203-1204.

On appeal, however, Perdue challenged the validity of those

Appellant's Brief at 9. However, the subsequent discussion
focuses solely on his contention that the comments brought in
outside evidence suggesting that defendant belonged to a gang.
Appellant's Brief at 9-15. Because defendant has briefed only
that contention, that is the only one presented for this Court's
determination. See, e.g.. State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344
(Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of the defendant's
state constitutional challenge because defendant failed to
provide any supporting legal analysis or authority).
13

instructions.

Id. at 1204-1206.

This Court refused to consider

the instructions7 legal sufficiency because Perdue had submitted
them and consequently invited any error.

Id. at 1205-1206.

Similarly, defendant suggested the course of action that the
trial court ultimately took to address Ms. Bingham's comments.
After defendant moved to strike the panel based on Ms. Bingham's
comments, the State conceded that Ms. Bingham acted
inappropriately, but contended that nothing established that her
comments affected the other jurors (R. 272-73).

In response,

defendant asked the Court only to question the panel about
whether the comments influenced them (R. 274). In response to
the court's subsequent comment that it could not see any
prejudice, counsel explained that the comments may have started
the other jurors thinking that they also had a negative reaction
to defendant's hair style (R. 274). However, counsel never
suggested that the court would have to strike the entire panel
even if none of the prospective jurors stated that Ms. Bingham's
comments had biased them; indeed, if that had been counsel's
contention, there would have been no need for the subsequent voir
dire.

(Transcript pages 272-81 are attached as addendum B.)

The sum of defendant's comments told the trial court that,
if Ms. Bingham's comments had not sparked any negative feelings
14

in the remaining prospective jurors, the court would not have to
quash the panel.

When the trial court asked the question

defendant requested and received no response, the trial court
legitimately concluded that it had resolved the issue.
Defendant's failure to renew his motion to quash further
solidified the trial court's conclusion.

If defendant believed

that the trial court should still have quashed the panel after
the voir dire that defendant suggested, he should have renewed
his motion or at least informed the trial court that he believed
the issue was unresolved.

His failure to do so led the trial

court not to take any further action.
This Court reached a similar conclusion in State v. Morgan.
835 P.2d 1377 (Utah App. 1993).

Morgan moved for a mistrial

after a juror made an inappropriate comment to an alternate
juror.

Id. at 1381. The trial court individually interviewed

each of the remaining jurors about any comments they may have
heard. Id.

Only one juror had, and she stated that she

considered the comment in poor taste. Id.
defendant did not renew the motion.

Id.

After this inquiry,

This Court held that

w

[f]rom all that appears, defendant was satisfied with the

additional scrutiny and at least tacitly withdrew the motion for
a mistrial."

Id.
15

Like Morgan, defendant failed to renew his motion.

As in

Morgan, it appears the voir dire satisfied defendant, and that he
tacitly withdrew his motion to quash.

Therefore, defendant

cannot now complain about the denial of his motion.
Defendant also cannot complain that the voir dire
insufficiently cured any taint: defendant defined the scope of
the voir dire.

Defendant wanted limited voir dire in order to

avoid any further negative comments in front of the entire panel,
asking the trial court to reserve more detailed questions for inchambers discussions with those who responded affirmatively to
the more general question (R. 273-74).

When no one did, no

reason remained for the trial court to ask the more detailed
questions.

Defendant cannot set the scope of the curative voir

dire, then complain about its sufficiency on appeal.

Cf. Id.

Finally, defendant failed to preserve the specific argument
he makes on appeal.

In order to preserve an appellate claim,

defendant must have objected with sufficient specificity to give
the trial court the first opportunity to rule on the claim.
State v. Rangel. 866 P.2d 607, 612 (Utah App. 1993) (generally
referring to due process concerns held insufficient to preserve a
challenge to a statute's facial constitutionality). On appeal,
defendant contends that Ms. Bingham's comments suggested to the
16

prospective jurors that defendant may belong to a gang.
Appellant's Brief at 9-10.

However, defendant complained to the

trial court only that the references to his hair may have sparked
some general prejudice in the other jurors. He made no claim
that the comments suggested gang affiliation; therefore, he never
alerted the trial court to his present concern.
A more specific objection also may have allowed the trial
court to address some of the arguments defendant makes on appeal.
For example, defendant claims that the jurors could not fairly
assess whether Ms. Bingham's statement would affect their
deliberations because they did not know what evidence the parties
would introduce.

Specifically, defendant contends that the

jurors did not know that the State's evidence would implicate
defendant as one of three Hispanic males who participated in
robbing Ms. Flores, and that a suggestion that defendant may
belong to a Mexican gang would affect that decision.

Had

defendant made the argument to the trial court that he makes to
this Court, the trial court could have included a synopsis of the
proposed evidence in his curative voir dire.
B.

Alternatively, defendant's claim fails on its merits.

The record contains no evidence that denying the motion
deprived defendant of his right to trial by an impartial jury.
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To the contrary, the other prospective jurors denied that Ms.
Bingham's comment had any influence on them, and the trial court
complied with defendant's request to probe no further.
The State could find no cases defining the standard of
appellate review for a trial court's refusal to quash the panel
based on a prospective juror's comments. However, when the
question of juror misconduct arises in other contexts, the
appellate courts have traditionally applied an abuse of
discretion standard.

State v. Morgan. 865 P.2d at 1380-81 (trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial
based on juror misconduct); State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750, 757
(Utah App.) (reviewing denial of motion for new trial based on
juror misconduct for abuse of discretion), cert, denied. 923 P.2d
693 (Utah 1996).

Similarly, this Court reviews a trial court's

decision to deny a challenge for cause for an abuse of
discretion.

State V. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1240 (Utah),

cert, denied. 510 U.S. 979 (1993); State V. BrQOkS, 868 P.2d 818,
821 n.3 (Utah App. 1994), affirmed. 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995).
The Court should adopt the same standard here.

Like the

challenge for cause, the issue raised in this claim concerns the
jury selection process. Also, like the motions for new trial and
mistrial, the underlying issue in this case deals with a
18

prospective juror's conduct.

In addition, the trial court is

uniquely position to assess the affect of the misconduct on the
remaining panel members.

The trial court can better assess the

credibility of the remaining members' responses to follow-up voir
dire as well as to assess the members' reaction to the comment in
the first place.

See State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 282 (Utah

1994) (identifying as a factor in determining the amount of
deference to give the trial court's decision the degree to which
the application of the legal principle depends on facts the trial
judge is uniquely positioned to evaluate).*
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying the motion because the record establishes that Ms.
Bingham's comments had no influence on the other panel members.
When asked, the other prospective jurors denied that her comments
influenced them (R. 281). The limitations defendant placed on
the voir dire precluded any additional inquiry.
Moreover, Ms. Bingham's comments did not clearly suggest
that defendant belonged to a gang, and nothing in the record
suggests that the other prospective jurors understood them to do
so.

In her rambling soliloquy, Ms. Bingham stated that she

2

Defendant concurs that abuse of discretion correctly states
the standard of review. Appellant's Brief at 1.
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thought defendant should cut his hair,3 commented that defendant
dressed like her neighbors, suggested that her neighbors belonged
to a gang, and identified her neighbors as "Mexicans" (R. 212).4
However, she drew no conclusion that her neighbors' dress was
related to their gang membership.

At most, her comments

establish that she could not be fair because defendant reminded
her of the Mexican neighbors she did not like.

Nothing suggests

that the other jurors understood the comments to signify anything
more.

In any event, the limitations defendant placed on the voir

dire precluded a more in depth inquiry into the effect Ms.
Bingham's comments had.
Defendant contends that this Court should presume prejudice
from Ms. Bingham's comments. Appellant's Brief at 12-14.

Under

this analysis, defendant contends that Ms. Bingham's comments
create a rebuttable presumption that the jury was tainted.

3

Defendant erroneously contends that Ms. Bingham stated that
he wore his hair like her neighbors. However, Ms. Bingham stated
only that defendant dressed like her neighbors, her comment about
his hair suggested only that she did not like his hair style (R.
212) .
4

As already quoted, Ms. Bingham stated, "I'm a very
emotional person. We live next door to a Mexican. Still upset
at them in gangs and he -- he dressed just like he did. I can't
understand. Why can't he shave that thing off the back of his
head? I'm sorry. I don't know if I could be fair" (R. 212).
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The cases on which defendant relies require the opposite
conclusion.

Those cases

apply

the rebuttable presumption only to

contacts between jurors and either witnesses, attorneys, or other
court personnel. £££, e.g., State v. Pikg. 712 P.2d 277, 279
(Utah 1985).

Unlike Pike, this case involves juror conduct

unrelated to improper contacts with any counsel, witnesses, or
court personnel; therefore, defendant must establish prejudice.
S££., £-.a. . State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254, 1263 (Utah 1983)
(applying a traditional prejudice analysis where two jurors read
newspaper accounts of the trial).
Moreover, the evil protected against by the rebuttable
presumption of prejudice does not exist in cases like this.

The

rebuttable presumption exists, in part, because contact between
the jurors and counsel, witnesses, or court personnel creates the
appearance of collusion between the jurors and one of the parties
or the court.

State Yt Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah App.

1992) . No appearance of collusion exists where, as here, jurors
make inappropriate comments.

Therefore, the Court should apply

no rebuttable presumption of prejudice.
Defendant argues alternatively that he has established
prejudice because Ms. Bingham's comments suggested that he
belonged to a Mexican gang and the evidence showed that he was in
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a group of Hispanics who robbed Ms. Flores. Appellant's Brief at
14-15.

For support, defendant depends on his assertion that Ms.

Bingham said that he looked like a Mexican gang member.

For the

reasons argued above, the record does not support this assertion;
therefore, defendant has not established prejudice from Ms.
Bingham's responses.
In short, defendant has not preserved this claim because he
invited any error in both the trial court's decision to deny the
motion to quash and in the scope of the court's curative voir
dire.

Defendant also failed to object to Ms. Bingham's comments

with sufficient particularity to preserve his appellate argument.
Alternatively, defendant has not established that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to quash the panel,
or that denying the motion deprived him of a trial by an
impartial jury: there is no record evidence that Ms. Bingham's
comments influenced the other prospective jurors.

POINT II
BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS ONE OF THREE MEN WHO CONFRONTED
THE VICTIM, THE RECORD CONTAINS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
THAT HE PARTICIPATED IN THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
Defendant contends that the evidence shows, at most, that he
was merely present at the robbery, but fails to show that he
participated as an accomplice.

Appellant's Brief at 16-19.
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Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence sufficiently
established that defendant encouraged or intentionally aided in
committing the robbery.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court
views the evidence and the inferences from it in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict.

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,

1212 (Utah 1993) . This Court may reverse for insufficient
evidence "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted."

Id.

In order to convict defendant, the jury had to conclude that
he had the mental state required to commit a criminal offense and
that he solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or
intentionally aided the man with the knife while that man robbed
Ms. Flores. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995).

See also State v.

Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450, 461-62 (Utah 1994) (defining the elements
of accomplice liability for purposes of the gang enhancement
statute).5
Defendant and two others appeared in front of Ms. Flores

defendant does not dispute that the evidence sufficiently
established that an aggravated robbery took place.
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while she started to enter her car (R. 306). Defendant and the
other man flanked the man with the knife; all three stood
approximately one foot from Ms. Flores (R. 306-309).

The man

with the knife held it to Ms. Flores' chest and demanded the
money (R. 309).
Admittedly, defendant said nothing intelligible to Ms.
Flores,6 did not threaten her with a weapon, and did not take the
money from her himself.

Nevertheless, the jury could reasonably

conclude that defendant encouraged or intentionally aided the man
with the knife.

Defendant did not stand back or move away from

the other two men, and he stood close enough to see the robbery.
The three men confronted Ms. Flores in formation: the lead man
holding the knife to her chest, his accomplices, including
defendant, close behind on either side. All three stood close
enough to Ms. Flores to grab her if she had tried to escape.

The

number of men and their proximity to Ms. Flores made it less
likely that Ms. Flores would try to escape or that she could
escape; their number made the confrontation in a dark parking lot
more intimidating; and the positions taken by the group suggests
a planned confrontation, or at least a concerted effort by all

6

Ms. Flores testified that defendant appeared to giggle or
mumble something unintelligible (R. 309).
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three men. Therefore, the record contains some evidence that
defendant encouraged or intentionally aided in committing the
robbery with the mental state to commit an offense.

See, e.g..

State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993) (*[w]e will affirm the
jury verdict as long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made'") (citation
omitted).
Essentially, defendant contends that he did not act as an
accomplice because he did not take the money from Ms. Flores, did
not say anything to her, and did not hold the knife.

Contrary to

defendant's contention, these facts do not necessitate concluding
that he intentionally aided in the robbery.

See Sanders v.

State. 423 So.2d 348, 351 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) ("[a]lthough
appellant did not say a word, carry the gun or touch the money,
his demeanor and actions during the course of the robbery
demonstrated clearly that he intended to aid and abet Houston in
committing the crime").

As already argued, the facts establish

that defendant acted as an accomplice to the aggravated robbery.
The cases on which defendant relies do not require a
contrary result.

For example, in State v. Wood. Lance Wood and

Michael Archuleta murdered Gordon Church.
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Prior to killing Mr.

Church, Archuleta sexually assaulted him three times. First,
Archuleta forced Mr. Church over the hood of the car and raped
him anally while Wood stood by the trunk of the car.

State v.

Wood. 868 P.2d at 75. Archuleta asked Wood if he "wanted any;"
Wood declined.

Id.

Second, Archuleta attached battery jumper

cable clamps to Mr. Church's genitals.

Id.

"Wood maintained

before and at trial that he removed the clamps from Church as
soon as he realized what Archuleta had done."

Id.

Finally,

Archuleta shoved and kicked a tire iron so far up Mr. Church's
rectum that it pierced his liver.

Id.

While Archuleta impaled

Mr. Church with the tire iron, Wood kicked Mr. Church.
88.

Id. at

On this evidence, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the

evidence failed to establish that Wood acted as an accomplice to
the first two acts of sexual assault, but that he did act as an
accomplice to the third.

Id.

Unlike Wood, defendant did not decline a specific invitation
to participate and took no action to negate the actions of the
man with the knife. Also unlike Wood, defendant was not
physically removed the crime.

To the contrary, defendant stood

close enough to Ms. Flores that he could have grabbed her if she
tried to escape.
This is not a case where defendant had the misfortune to be
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present while the man with the knife committed the robbery;
defendant stood at the robber's side, lending support through his
presence.

Compare also State v. Helm. 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah

1977) (other officers not accomplices to defendant officer's
evidence tampering where jury found that the officers merely
followed their superior's orders and did not know what he
planned); State v. Gee. 498 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1972) (two
witnesses were not accomplices, and could therefore testify,
where there was no evidence that they assisted in or were present
during the crime).

Therefore, the evidence is not so inherently

improbable that reasonable persons must have entertained a
reasonable doubt about defendant's participation.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AND FAIRLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY ON THE ELEMENTS OF BOTH ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
Defendant contends that the trial court excessively
emphasized the elements of aggravated robbery over accomplice
liability by including an instruction about aggravated robbery in
addition to the elements instruction.
20.7

Appellant's Brief at 19-

However, defendant does not contend that these instructions

7

Defendant did not contest that someone robbed Ms. Flores at
knife-point. He argued only that he did not participate and that
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misstate the law or that the trial court refused to give a
necessary instruction.

A.

Standard of appellate review-

No case specifically defines the scope of appellate review
when an appellant claims that individually accurate instructions
unfairly emphasize some aspect of the case.

Cases considering a

trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction review the
matter as a question of law, giving no deference to the trial
court's decision.

£££, g t g t , State v, RQbertSPn, No. 940374 at

18 (Utah February 18, 1997).

However, the trial court has

discretion to select between two legally sufficient instructions.
State v. Galleaos. 849 P.2d 586, 590 (Utah App. 1993).
Defendant does not claim that the instructions given
misstate the law; only that they inordinately focus on one aspect
of the case.

Defendant's challenge does not present a question

of the instructions' legal sufficiency.

Rather, defendant

challenges the trial court's selection among legal sufficient
instructions.

Therefore, the Court should apply an abuse of

discretion standard.

Cf. State v. Galleaos.

849 P.2d 586, 590

(Utah App. 1993) (the trial court has discretion to select

she could not identify him adequately (R. 369).
raised the second issue on appeal.)
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(He has not

between two legally sufficient, but different jury instructions).
B.

The record does not support defendant's argument.

Even under a nondeferential standard of review, however,
defendant's argument fails on its merits because it relies on a
premise that the record rebuts: that the court gave only one
accomplice liability instruction and two aggravated robbery
instructions.

The trial court's elements instruction contained

the elements of both aggravated robbery and accomplice liability
(R. 151). Immediately before that instruction, the trial court
gave the statutory definition of aggravated robbery (R. 150).
Immediately after the elements instruction, the trial court gave
the statutory definition of accomplice liability (R. 152). In
two subsequent instructions, the trial court clarified that
defendant's mere presence would not suffice to convict him as an
accomplice, and that the jury could consider only defendant's
conduct and could not consider the status of the other
participants (R. 153-54).

Contrary to defendant's contention,

the trial court gave four instructions defining and clarifying
accomplice liability, and only two aggravated robbery
instructions.

If anything, the trial court emphasized accomplice

liability over aggravated robbery.
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C.

Defendant has not established prejudice from the

instructions.
Moreover, defendant cannot establish prejudice on this
record.

See State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929, 930-31 (Utah App.

1991) (w[w]e will reverse on the basis of an improper instruction
only where the defendant demonstrates prejudice stemming from the
instructions viewed in the aggregate"), reversed on other
grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993).

Even if the instructions had

given insufficient emphasis to the elements of accomplice
liability, both attorneys' closing arguments clearly identified
that the case turned on whether defendant acted as an accomplice
(R. 3 68-77, 382, 384-86).

The jury could not have become

confused and convicted defendant based solely on a finding that
an aggravated robbery occurred without taking the additional step
of finding him guilty as an accomplice.

POINT IV
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR
INSTRUCTION; ALTERNATIVELY,
DEFINED REASONABLE DOUBT BY
APPROVED BY BOTH THIS COURT

IN THE REASONABLE DOUBT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
USING A JURY INSTRUCTION
AND THE SUPREME COURT

Defendant contends that the trial court incorrectly defined
reasonable doubt for the jury.

Appellant's Brief at 21-25.

Defendant further contends that, in light of the purported
deficiencies in the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction,
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the trial court erroneously refused to give his reasonable
alternative hypothesis instruction.

Appellant's Brief at 25-27.

Generally, a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury
instruction presents a legal question reviewed for correctness.
See, e.g.. State v. Galleaos. 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993).
However, the trial court has discretion to select between two
accurate but different jury instructions.

p.2d 586, 590 (Utah App. 1993).

State v. Galleaos, 849

isL. see also State v, Petersen,

802 P.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Utah App. 1990) (u[s]ince we conclude the
court's instruction was appropriate, we need not consider whether
defendant's proposed instruction might also have been proper or
even preferable"), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
The trial court defined reasonable doubt in the same
language that this Court approved in Pedersen and the Utah
Supreme Court approved in Robertson (R. 142)(a copy of the
instruction is attached as addendum C).

State v. Pedersen, 802

P.2d at 1331; State v. Robertson. No. 940374 (Utah February 18,
1997).

Defendant presented the trial court with his own

reasonable doubt instruction (R. 125)(a copy is attached as
addendum D).

Defendant objected to the trial court's proposed

instruction; however, defendant contended only that his proposed
instruction more clearly defined reasonable doubt (R. 361).
31

Defendant did not contend that the court's instruction misstated
the standard; to the contrary, he acknowledged that this Court
had approved the language (id.).
Defendant failed to preserve his appellate claim.

First,

defendant invited any error when he told the trial court that its
instruction adequately defined reasonable doubt, but that his
defined it better.

State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688 (Utah App.

1995) controls this issue.

Blubaugh responded to the State's

proposed "depraved indifference" instruction that it accurately
stated the law, but that his provided a more accurate and
adequate definition of depraved indifference.

Id. at 700. This

Court held that Blubaugh invited error, precluding review of his
appellate claim, when he agreed that the instruction given
correctly defined depraved indifference.

Id.

Similarly, defendant told the trial court that its proposed
instruction was legally sufficient under existing case law and
stated only that his gave a clearer definition of reasonable
doubt (R. 361). Under Blubauah. defendant cannot tell the trial
court that its proposed instruction is legally sufficient, then
argue for the first time on appeal that it is not.
Moreover, defendant did not provide a specific enough
objection to the trial court's instruction to preserve his
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appellate argument. £££, e.g., State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358,
360-61 (Utah App. 1993) (to preserve an appellate argument,
defendants must object with sufficient specificity to give the
trial court the first opportunity to correct the errors).

In

this Court, defendant contends that the trial court's instruction
presumed his guilt and minimized the State's burden of proof.
Appellant's Brief at 23-25.

In the trial court, however,

defendant contended only that his instruction more clearly
defined reasonable doubt.

Because defendant did not give the

trial court the opportunity to address the deficiencies he now
claims burdened the court's reasonable doubt instruction, he has
not preserved those claims for this Court's review.

See State v.

Range1. 866 P.2d 607, 612 (Utah App. 1993) (generally referring
to due process concerns held insufficient to preserve a challenge
to a statute's facial constitutionality).
Alternatively, defendant's argument fails on its merits.
This Court must apply a three-part test to determine whether the
reasonable doubt instruction correctly states Utah law: 1) the
instruction must specifically state that the State's proof must
obviate all reasonable doubt; 2) the instruction should not state
that a reasonable doubt equates to one that governs a person in
the "more weighty affairs of life; and 3) the instruction may not
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instruct that a reasonable doubt is not a mere possibility, but
it may state that a fanciful or wholly speculative possibility
does not defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Robertson. No. 940374 at 20.

State v.

In Robertson, the supreme court

found that a reasonable doubt instruction identical to the one
given in this case passed all three criteria.

Id. at 19-21.

Therefore, under Robertson, the trial court correctly instructed
the jury on reasonable doubt.
Defendant contends that the instruction: 1) presumes
defendant's guilt; and 2) lowers the State's burden of proof.
Appellant's Brief at 23-25.

To support these contentions,

defendant reduces the instruction to individual sentences, even
to individual phrases. Appellant's Brief at 22-23.

Defendant's

proposed analysis, however, directly contradicts the appropriate
inquiry: whether the jury instructions taken as a whole fairly
tender the case to the jury.

£££, e,gt, State v. Perdue. 813

P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App.. 1991) .8 Moreover, this Court has
expressly rejected an analysis similar to defendant's.

In State

v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929 (Utah App. 1991), Haston, like defendant,

8

The sole exception to this rule is that this Court must
reverse when the elements instruction omits one of the elements
even though another instruction may include it. State v. Jones.
734 P.2d 473, 475-76 (Utah 1987).
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dissected the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction.

This

Court held that wwe consider the instruction in its entirety."
JtfL at 932, reversed on other grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993).
Defendant's arguments fail when the instructions are viewed
as a whole.

Defendant relies on a single sentence to support his

claim that the instruction shifted the burden of proof to him:
"And, in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is
satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal" (R.
142)(emphasis added).

According to defendant, the highlighted

language presumes that guilt exists. Appellant's Brief at 23.
Both the reasonable doubt instruction and numerous other verbal
and written instructions informed the jury that the State had to
prove defendant's guilt.

At the beginning of the case, the trial

court informed the jury that defendant pleaded not guilty, and
that defendant's plea required the State to prove defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that the jury had to acquit
defendant if a reasonable doubt existed; and that the State's
evidence must eliminate all reasonable doubt (R. 286-87).

Before

deliberations, the trial court again instructed the jury that
defendant's guilty plea required the State to prove each of the
essential allegations beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 138).
The reasonable doubt instruction began by reminding the jury
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that "All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 142). The
instruction states a second time that the State has the burden of
proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (id.).

In

the eyewitness identification instruction, the trial court again
stated, "I again emphasize that the burden of proving that the
defendant is the person who committed the crime in on the
prosecution," and that, if a reasonable doubt existed, the jurors
must find defendant not guilty (R. 161).
In addition to the instructions, defense counsel repeatedly
reminded the jury who had the burden of proof.

In her opening

statement, counsel told the jurors that, because they had yet to
hear any evidence, they had to presume defendant innocent; and
that the presumption of innocence is not a neutral position, but
a presumption that defendant is not guilty (R. 295-97).

Again,

in her closing, counsel emphasized that the State, not defendant,
had the burden of proof (R. 378).
Therefore, even if "his guilt," when read in isolation,
conceivably suggests that defendant committed the charged crime,
the instructions, when read as a whole, could have left no doubt
that the jury must acquit defendant unless State discharged its
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duty to prove defendant's guilt.9
Similarly, the instructions correctly stated the State's
burden.

Defendant also contends that the reasonable doubt

instruction permits the jurors to convict if the evidence merely
satisfies them of defendant's guilt. Appellant's Brief at 23.
Defendant relies on the same sentence to support his argument:
"And, in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is
satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal" (R.
142)(emphasis added).
Again, defendant's argument depends on reviewing the phrase
"satisfactorily shown" out of context with the rest of the
reasonable doubt instruction, the instructions as a whole, and
counsel's argument.

As summarized above, the instructions and

argument repeatedly reminded the jury that, to convict defendant,
they had to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (R.
138, 142, 161, 286-87, 295-97, 378). When read in context of the
instructions as a whole, "satisfactorily shown" means that the
State must have satisfied the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant committed the crime.

9

Moreover, defendant's argument tortures the syntax of the
entire sentence on which he relies: the rest of the sentence
tells the jurors that guilt must be "shown." Therefore, it does
not presume that guilt already exists.
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Defendant also complains that the sentence "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty"
implies that the State has the benefit of a degree of doubt as to
its proof.

Appellant's Brief at 23. Defendant contends that the

sentence misstates the law because uncertainty or doubt inures to
his benefit.10
Again, defendant invited any error in using this language
because he proposed the same language (R. 125). See State v.
Haston. 811 P.2d at 932 (Haston could not challenge language in
the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction that he included
in his proposed instruction).
Alternatively, this argument fails on its merits because it
relies on a misstatement of the law: defendant is not entitled to
the benefit of any uncertainty or doubt, only to the benefit a
reasonable uncertainty or doubt. £JL. State V, RobertSQtt, No.
940374 at 20-21 (approving language that a reasonable doubt is
one that reasonable persons would entertain).

The instructions

specifically informed the jury that they had to acquit defendant
if a reasonable doubt existed (R. 142).
Finally, defendant complains that the structure of the

10

Defendant acknowledges that the sentence correctly states
the law. Appellant's Brief at 25.
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reasonable doubt instruction "narrows the definition of
reasonable doubt almost to the point of non-existence."
Appellant's Brief at 24. This occurs, according to defendant,
because much of the instruction tells the jury what reasonable
doubt is not.

Id,

Defendant's argument proceeds from a mistaken premise.
Defining reasonable doubt negatively does not diminish it to the
point of non-existence.

The instruction clarifies reasonable

doubt in part by eliminating what it is not. After the
elimination process, what is left is reasonable doubt.

It does

not diminish it to non-existence, it simply distills away points
of possible confusion.
For the reasons argued above, defendant has not established
any error in the reasonable doubt instruction given.
Defendant also contends that the trial court should have
given his reasonable alternative hypothesis.

This claim stands

or falls on the validity of the reasonable doubt instruction
given.

When the trial court adequately defines the State's

burden in other instructions, it may refuse a reasonable
alternative hypothesis instruction.

See State v. Robertson. No.

940374 at 21 (reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction is
not required where the trial court instructs the jury that they
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must find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt); State v.
£lQU$i# 722 P.2d 750, 755-56 (Utah 1986).

For the reasons argued

above, defendant has shown no reversible error in the reasonable
doubt instruction given.

Therefore, the trial court properly

refused his reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction.
In sum, defendant invited any error when he confirmed the
legal sufficiency of the trial court's reasonable doubt
instruction and waived his appellate arguments by not presenting
them to the trial court. Alternatively, he trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it selected a reasonable doubt
instruction approved by the appellate courts over defendant's
proposed instruction.

POINT V
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT PROFFER THE TESTIMONY THAT HE
ANTICIPATED A PROSPECTIVE WITNESS WOULD GIVE, THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY DENIED HIS MOTION TO CONTINUE IN ORDER
TO LOCATE THE WITNESS
At the pretrial conference, held six days before trial,
defense counsel asked for a continuance to find a witness (R.
192, 196) . Counsel told the trial court that she had left
messages with a person who may know the prospective witness, but
had not received word back (R. 192). Defense counsel told the
court that she did not know what the witness would say, only that
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she believed the witness was at the robbery and needed to talk to
him to determine what he might say (R. 193). The trial court
denied the motion because defendant failed to establish any
particulars about the witness's proposed testimony (R. 193-94).
Defendant contends that denying the motion deprived him of due
process.

Appellant's Brief at 27-30.

This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for a
continuance for a clear abuse of discretion only.
State v. Cabututan. 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993).

See, e.g..
To prevail on

appeal, defendant must also establish that the denial materially
prejudiced him or that he could have obtained a different result
if the trial court had granted the motion.

State v. Oliver. 820

P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah
1992) .
In order to obtain a continuance to procure the witness's
testimony, defendant had the burden to show "that the testimony
sought is material and admissible, that the witness could
actually be produced, that the witness could be produced within a
reasonable time, and that due diligence has been exercised before
the request for a continuance."

State v. Linden. 761 P.2d 1386,

1387 (Utah 1988) . In Linden, the supreme court affirmed the
denial of a continuance because the record lacked any information
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about the names and availability of Linden's witnesses, the
materiality of their testimony, or any other facts that would
have assisted the trial court in determining whether the
witnesses had essential or only cumulative testimony.
Defendant similarly failed to meet his burden.

Id.

Defense

counsel never identified the witness; not only failed to
establish that the witness had material testimony, but admitted
that she did not even know what he would say; had not actually
talked to the witness, and consequently could not establish that
she could procure his attendance at all, let alone within a
reasonable time (R. 192-93).

Therefore, under Linden, the trial

court properly denied defendant's motion for a continuance.
Defendant turns his burden on its head in order to excuse
his failure to meet it. He contends that his counsel could not
meet this burden until she spoke to the witness.

Essentially,

defendant argues that, whenever defense counsel tells the trial
court that she knows of a person who may have seen something
relevant and may testify about what he saw, but does not know
that the person saw anything, does not know what the person would
say, and cannot establish that she can produce the person in a
reasonable time, the trial court nevertheless abuses its
discretion when it denies a continuance motion to obtain the
42

person's presence.

Linden recognizes that the trial court need

not wait for witnesses with unknown testimony and unknown
availability.

If defendant cannot even proffer what a possible

witness might add to his defense, the trial court need not delay
trial to secure the witness's attendance.
Defendant also has not established that denying the motion
materially prejudiced his case or that granting the motion would
have changed the result.11

To the contrary, defendant has never

shown what the witness could have added to his case.

It is just

as likely that the witness saw nothing, or that what the witness
saw would have supported the State's case.
Because defendant has shown neither an abuse of discretion
in

or prejudice from denying the motion, he has not established

that denying it constitutes reversible error.

11

Defendant made the motion six days before trial (R.
192). In effect, defendant had at least six additional days to
locate the witness. However, defendant never again mentioned the
witness. Consequently, he never established that he could secure
the witness's testimony even if given more time.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued above, the State requests that the
Court affirm defendant's conviction.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

76-2-202

PART2
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF
ANOTHER
76-2-201- Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) *Agent* means any director, officer, employee, or other person
authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or association.
(2) "High managerial agent" means:
(a) A partner in a partnership;
(b) An officer of a corporation or association;
(c) An agent of a corporation or association who has duties of such
responsibility that his conduct reasonably may be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or association.
(3) "Corporation" means all organizations required by the laws of this
state or any other state to obtain a certificate of authority, a certificate of
incorporation, or other form of registration to transact business as a
corporation within this state or any other state and shall include domestic,
foreign, profit and nonprofit corporations, but shall not include a corporation sole, as such term is used in Title 16, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated
1953. Lack of an appropriate certificate of authority, incorporation, or
other form of registration shall be no defense when such organization
conducted its business in a manner as to appear to have lawful corporate
existence.
History: C. 1963, 76-2-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196,1 76-2-201.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Utah's Statute
Am. Jur. 2d* — 73 Am. Jar. 2d Statutes
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Lia- f 224.
bility: A Guide for Lawyers and Directors, 1988
GJ.S. — 22 CJ A Criminal Law | 127.
Utah L Rev. 847.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 1,13.

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission
of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct
History: C. 1953, 76*2-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196,1 76-2-202.
Cross-Reference*. — Aiding violation of

Wildlife Resources Code, ( 23-20-23.
Obstructing justice, i 76*306.
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76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery* if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediateflightafter the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, I 76-6-302; 1975, ch. 51, f 1;
1989, ch. 170, i 7; 1994, ch. 271,1 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, added Subjection
(1X0.

ADDENDUM B

explaining why she was so upset.

But she talked about

having lost a son to suicide and then a couple of times
mentioned the word "prejudice".
And then, at some point, started talking about—it
wasn't clear to me even what the connection was, if any,
with her son's suicide, but something about, I'm still upset
with the Mexicans that live next door to me or in my
neighborhood.

And she was looking at Mr. Loretto and

gesturing towards him.
dress like he did.

Saying something like, and they

And I don't know why he doesn't cut off,

and kind of demonstrated the hair on the back of his neck.
And now that wasn't responsive to any particular question.
It was just a comment she was making, trying to explain her
situation.
But I think the clear implication is, is that she
has some prejudice against or concern about the neighbors
she has.

That she, I think, was trying to express she may

have the same concern about my client, Gilbert Loretto. An
was pointing out to other jurors his hairstyle and I guess
his manner of dress.

I'm not exactly sure, but she was

referring to my client.
THE COURT: He was dressed great.
MS. REMAL:

Dressed okay, but he did have a

particular hairstyle that she was obviously trying to, when
she demonstrated kind of to the back of her neck, that she
77
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is referring to long hair at the back of the neck.
2I
My concern is that she has tainted the whole panel

3
4

by doing that.

And so I would move, first of all, to strike

5

the whole panel for cause, for that reason.

6

I also have some s p e c i f i c —

7

THE COURT:

Before you get to these, Mr. Blaylock,

do you want to respond to that?
8

MR. BLAYLOCK:

9
10 I before, we could have

Well, your Honor, if we had known

asked the jurors that came in here

how

11

those comments affected them.

Z think most of them would

12

have indicated that that bothered them and that they thought

13

that she w a s — I don't think it would have influenced them in

14

any way.

15

attitude she had and the way she was acting was

16

inappropriate; but we don't know what the jury thinks

It would have bothered them, but I think the

because we didn't ask that question.

If we had known

17

I before, we could have inquired of the individuals that we
examined in chambers.
"•9
THE COURT: Ha. Remal, any final comment?
18

20 J

M S . REMAL:

I guess in response to that, we could

certainly ask the question.
22

I

We could go back out and the

Court could ask something like, You heard the comments that

23

were made by M s . Bingham, I guess that's her name, and is

24

there anybody that has been influenced in any way?

25

I

I don't

know if you want to use "influenced", or that has been
78
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biased about that.
And then to avoid the other similar type of
problem, to bring them into chambers to find out what that
means.

We don't want them to say it in front of anybody

else again.
THE COURT:

Hell, I'm not sure that I have a

problem in asking the question.
8
9

I don't think that,

however, that she said anything that would prejudice
J anything that this defendant—well, she was describing a

10

personal prejudice she has about a hairstyle and whatever.

11

How would that taint the other jurors?

12

MS. REMAL:

Well, I'm afraid that the other jurors

13

would say, gee, I hadn't noticed that hairstyle.

14

speaking of it and I noticed that, too.

Now she's

And geez, that is

15

I kind of a problem.

16

' what that means, or maybe they know someone of a similar

17

| style.

18

' that out to them.

19
20

That's an unusual hairstyle and wonder

They've got a problem with that.

And simply point

And certainly, she made it quite clear

that for her, that's a negative thing.
I

And it seems like others are then going to be
particularly noticing that and maybe they will say, gee,

22

I maybe I think that's negative, too.

23

I whole reason why we don't want people expressing negative

I mean, that's the

opinions about defendants or witnesses or whatever, because
25

| the rest, well, it might get them thinking as well.
7»

& /. n ** *" *,

THE COURT:

Mr. Blaylock, do you have any

objection if the question is asked?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

I have no objection.

I think the

Court can kind of—well, it 1 * already covered when the Court
asked if there was any particular reason they would not like
to have themselves sitting on the jury.
THE COURT:

Well, I'll ask, and I think that

probably that did cover it; but I'm going to go ahead and
ask the question and ask if Mrs. Bingham1s comments in any
way, if they feel in any way that would affect their ability!
to be fair after considering her comments.
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, in regard to the other--

THE COURT:

But at this point, I'm going to deny

the motion to strike the entire panel.
Are there any others that you have?
MS. REMAL:

There are, your Honor.

I would move to strike No. 4, Bart Rowland,
because he indicated that because someone is a police
officer, he believes that they would not lie.
THE COURT:

Before you get into that, let's take

them one at a time.
Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

A number of similar situations and

I don't know that they could be avoided merely because of a
person's position, he would be more credible.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. BLAYLOCR:

3

THE COURT:

4

There were also others?

5

MS. REMAL:

6

You do not object?
That's No. 4?

That takes care of No. 4.

Ms. Castillo, No. 5, indicated the

same, so I would move to strike her.

7

THE COURT:

8

Mr. Eliason is No. 9?

9

MS. REMAL:

Just a moment.

Right.

Let me get these.

He indicated the same.

10

MR. BLAYLOCK:

11

MS. REMAL:

No. 11.

12

THE COURT:

You know, I've never had anyone answer

13

in that way to that question.

14

MS. REMAL:

15

I've had people answer affirmatively

to it before, but not this many on one panel.

16
17

Mr. Carter.

THE COURT:

And here, on this one panel, we have

five.

18

MR. BLAYLOCK:

19

THE COURT: Who is after Carter?

20

MR. BLAYLOCK:

21

Pearl World was the last one.

Pearl World, No. 25. Her husband

was with the Sheriff's Department.

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

MS. REMAL:

I thought there were five.

24

MR. BLAYLOCK:

25

MS. REMAL:

Pearl World, she's No. 25.

There were five. No. 11 and 25.

Okay.

81

THE COURT:
correct?

Mo. 4, Ho. 5, Mo. 11, No. 9 and 25;

All right.
Any others?
MS. REMAL:

Yes.

The next one was Ms. Jones. I

understand that she tried very hard and indicated to us as
best as she could.

I think that she felt as though she

could be fair as a juror and indicated that there were—she
has experienced both sides of the situation, and
nonetheless, Z would move to strike her.

I think it is just

too close for comfort that she herself was a victim of a
robbery and in a situation somewhat similar to what the
State is alleging already.
She is a woman who lives alone, at night was
approached by somebody on foot. Money was taken from her
and granted, it was 13 years ago; but nonetheless, I think
that those factors certainly are going to make her identify
with the alleged victim, who also is a woman who was alone,
in a parking lot, after dark, and money was taken from her.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BLAYLOCK:
impartial.

Mr. Blaylock?

She indicated she could be fair and|

I think she probably could.

THE COURT:

I'll deny four challenge with regard

to Lisa Jones.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

There's a balancing interest on thej

other side because of her feelings toward the—
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THE COURT: My impression of course is, these
matters are largely within the discretion of the Judge. I
have to go based on my feeling that she would be fair and
impartial as a juror.
Do you have any others?
MS. REMAL:

Yes.

I would move to strike, I don't

know if it's Jose or Jose'Velasco.

No. 22, in the back row.

THE COURT:

Velasco?

MS. REMAL:

He indicated that he was a witness of

a robbery, and in fact, sounds like he was a victim of a
robbery as well. He indicated that that was about seven
years ago when he lived in L.A.

He was the manager of a

store in which there was a robbery at gunpoint and money wasj
taken.
When the Court asked him whether or not he
believed he could be fair or whether or not he thought that
would affect him, his first response was, "I hope not", and
then after a follow-up question, he indicated that he
thought he could be fair again.

Being the victim of that

kind of a situation, when a weapon was used, here the
allegation is that a weapon was used.

In that situation,

money was taken, in this situation the allegations are that
money was taken.
And I feel as though he wouldn't be able to be
fair and that would affect your judgment.
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THE COURT: Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:
and impartial.

He indicated that be could be fair

I believe he could.

There's a lot of

competing interest there, also.
THE COURT: My feeling is that he could be fair.
I don't get the impression that he's prejudiced in any way;
in fact, I thought he was quite favorable and I was
impressed with Mr. Velasco.
Any others?
MS. REMAL:

That's it.

THE COURT: Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:
Ho.

He have 17 left.

I don't have any challenges for cause. The

question we have before us is what we do with Mr. Killpack.
THE COURT:

How, we have the hardship folks. With|

regard to the hardships, let's discuss those.
There was Mr. Cornelison who works at Federal
Express.

I think he probably has some financial problems,

but any juror is faced with that.

I think that's not a good|

excuse.
Mr. Killpack, on the other hand, I was a little
concerned about that because he's self-employed.

I have a

lot of sympathy for these people who are self-employed,
contractors; trying to schedule people who come in and build
houses.

There is pressure to get a house built in a certainj
64
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1

period of time.

2

-afternoon and they're going to have to cancel.

3
4

You've got to get concrete poured this
Ifm inclined)

to excuse him, but either of you object?
|

MR. BLAYLOCK:

1

MS. REMAL:

Re still have 16.

Your Honor, I would object.

I feel

6

like I understand it's hard for him and I guess I don't

7

really see that his financial hardship is really any worse

8
9

than Mr. Cornelison's or anybody else's.

It's very

I inconvenient for him and I know it is a hassle; but it

10

sounded like from what he said that he could make

11

arrangements if he needed to, as long as he knew within the

12

next little while if he was going to be selected or not.

13

then he could call somebody to get a message to the people

14

J who are waiting for him.

15

I

MR. BLAYLOCK:

So)

Call the cement company and tell

1

® • them not to come.

17

|

THE COURT:

Yeah.

He can.

Well, all right.

You

object and so let's wait and see, and if we get to kind of aj
19

J borderline discretion issue, I'll ask this final question

20 |

an(j s e e

kow

21

get out.

Okay?

All right.

(Whereupon, the Court resumed session in open

22

court.)

23

T H E COURT:

24
25

we

Let's go back on the record.

Let the

record show the presence of the jury, the counsel and the
I

defendant.
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1
2

Members of the jury, I thank you for your
patience.

It took a little longer than we had anticipated.

3

I have one final question I would like to ask each]

4

of you.

5

had had a recent suicide in her family, who was quite

6

•motional as she responded to some of my questions.

7

Do you recall Mrs. Helen Bingham, Juror No. 3, who

And Mrs. Bingham made some comments about some

8

personal prejudices in connection with this case. And

9

perhaps that could be interpreted by some that way, not

10

entirely clear, but she mentioned various things that

11

concerned her about this case and in connection with the

12

defendant in this case.

13

Anyone here who feels that they were influenced by

14

those comments of Mrs. Bingham in any way that would make it

15

difficult for them to be fair and impartial, based upon her

16

comments?

Anyone?

No response.

17

Anything else, Counsel?

18

Mr. Tanner?

Yes.

19

MR. TANNER:

I misunderstood what your question

20

is.

21

years ago.

I did put in two six-months period in the jury about 34

22

THE COURT:

23

criminal case or a civil case?

24

MR. TANNER:

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

And was that a

Civil.
Civil case?

Do you recall if you

8 6
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ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION N
All presumptions
favor of innocence

if J JW

_[^

^_

independent

of evidence, are in

an 1 a defendant is presumed innocent until he

IH pruned quilt y beyond a J eab unable doubt

And,

in case

jf J

reasonable doubt as tu whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he is entitled to an acquittal.
I have

h o i el of 0 1 ^

f oJ d \ i >u I 11 il

I h e b i n I i i - j| n I lie

i o prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

t at t

Proof

beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof tc an absolute
certainty.
based

d »ubf

i i

is meant

jn reason and one which is reasonable

evidence.
merely

Now by reasonable

ibl that

in view of all the

It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is

fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly

possibility.

speculative

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree t f

proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it
3L11

reasonable

doubt.

'* reasonable

doubt

reasonable men unl women would entertain
the evidence or the lack ot

is

and obviates
J loubt

an i if miiHt

which

inse trom

the evidence in this case

o ft n r

ADDENDUM D

INSTRUCTION (1
M

proved

defendant is presumed

guilty

beyond

d

IIJIJ

reasonable

u enl

JI

Jess flit defendant

doubt.

Where

there

JS d

reasonable doubt, the defendant is entitled fn an acquittal
the State's responsil 11 ity f
reasonable

doubt.

reasonable doubt.

The

" .L

it is

pi ve the delenJariL JI ill y beyond «i

State's

evidence

must

eliminate

a Ii

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does

not require proof to an absolute certainty,
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and
women would entertain, and it must be based on the evidence or the
lack

>f evidence in the rase

In some circumstances, the mere

possibility that the defendant did net commit the crime with which
IK S!R is tharqftl may « teatt <i reasonable duiii t , huwf vet , ariy su h
possibility must be based upon reason and logic, and not upon a
purely emotional urge or a wholly speculative possibility.
Jrocf IP> I 1 J i edoi rial IM inul r i

! hat Inijree

f ) r f

which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who
art

are bound

to

reasonable

IJUIJ

i

crime beyond

reason,

conscientiously

upon

it

and

/ If t ei m i n<jt J u tliat d
H

reasonable

doubt

assurance if tlif r en t ML t nefaH

I I ndant lia

demands

impartiality and common sense

eliminates

ail

romnitteii

the application of
i must

»1 eu h a (k

ha/e greater

i iiiu than you would

normally have in reaching the weighty decisions affecting your r wn
life

The reason for this standard is that you cannot undo your

verdjit, once yoi have auiu mi nil ii

In , HJI persona

lite,

n I h'

other hand, you may be able to undo or modify the consequences ox
decisions you make.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard
of proof in the American system of justice; it is the standard that
is always used in criminal cases, such as the case you will be
deciding here.

It is a much higher standard of proof than the

standards of preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing
evidence used in civil cases. If a scale were used to demonstrate
the various standards of proof, with complete uncertainty at one
end of the scale and absolute certainty at the other end, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt would be very close to the absolute
certainty end of the scale.
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